By Kraisak Choonhavan

The international media has largely portrayed the protracted protests in Bangkok this past month as a class struggle between rich urban elites and a poor, neglected rural mass. Identifying the Red Shirts’ protest as a “Class Struggle” is a clever marketing slogan, but it is not a true reflection of the political struggle in Thailand, which is not so easily pigeon-holed as an ideological battle between rich and poor.

In the first place, to wage a true class war, the political movement siding with the mass of the people needs a clear policy of promoting the participation in government of people from every level.  However, the Red Shirt platform is about returning power to the people through elections, without a clear programme of social and political reform to follow.

Moreover, when Thaksin was the Prime Minister, he never really included people’s participation in the process of decision- making in government, or the scrutinizing of big projects and whom they benefitted. Rather, his government adopted policies that showered poor people with money and easier access to services, which is a little different from facilitating broader participation and representation in decision-making.

In fact, his government ignored the view of ordinary people when it came to development projects that could severely affect livelihoods and natural resources in accordance to Section 56 of the 1997 Constitution, and was bent on signing Free Trade Agreements without consulting people as required by Section 244, Paragraph 2 of the 1997 Constitution or in Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution.

Thaksin excluded people’s participation from the policy-making process because he thought it was too complicated and would hold up his executive style of leadership. His decision to sign FTAs later resulted in extensive negative impacts on small farmers.

Thaksin’s government deployed populist policies to gain popularity among the people by giving them money to spend freely. In some cases, SDAO (Sub District Administration Organization) officers or heads of villages were aware of the need for accountability and opened special accounts for the villagers to invest in projects for the whole community. However, most of the cases, the money was spent on non-sustainable issues, making people feel richer for a short while, but usually ending up further in debt.

Neither was Thaksin really interested in redistributing the wealth more fairly in Thailand. What Thaksin called “Asset Capitalization” is only a dead slogan. Genuine “Asset Capitalization” needs a systematic and concrete land tenure distribution policy because land is a basic component of production in the economic system. Thanksin’s government never launched such policy. Instead, his family established SC Asset Corp. of which main policy was to consolidate and acquire large land plots. The company used Thaksin’s family preferences and the dominating power of policy making to gain possession of large tracts of state land.

By contrast, the Abhisit government established a Land Reform Committee that was chaired by the Prime Minister and comprised of representatives from civil society and the government sector. Although the committee’s performance has been slow, it has resulted in a new policy of community title deeds used to transfer ownership from State land to the people who already occupy the land. True enough, the policy has faced stiff resistance from government officials, but the Red Shirts have instead targeted General Surayuth Chulanond’s house at Khao Yai.

Before accusing the current government of ignoring the poor and calling for class war, it is necessary to point out that this government did not abandon Thaksin’s policy of direct budget allocation to villages throughout the country. On the contrary, the budget was increased threefold and now stands at 18 billion baht.  The government has also stepped up compensation to families affected by development projects, such as the thousands of families affected by the Rasisalai Dam construction in the Northeastern Provinces of Srisaket; Roi-Ed; and Surin who received a total amount of 795 million.

Abhisit’s government used the Bank of Agriculture and Cooperatives as a mechanism to insure the price of agricultural products and to pay directly to individual farmers. This practice is different from the old policy of which payments were made through big agricultural product exporters or rice mills by budget distribution. The old policy created widespread corruption among the capitalists and allowed the rich to take advantage of the farmers.

Just as importantly, when there report of corruption surfaced, the government has acted and resignations have ensued. Both a deputy prime minister and the commerce minister have lost their jobs for this reason.

The Abhisit government has also tried to lower costs and the level of debt among the poor by providing 15 years of free education for all, universal healthcare coverage for 99% of the population, and a 500 baht monthly allowance for elderly people.   Even if some of these policies build on what Thaksin started in his first term, there has certainly been no rolling back of social policies that benefit the majority of people.

What then is this so-called Class War about?  Why is the current government being targeted when it has introduced Progressive taxation; systematic land tenure distribution; better labour rights; and a more equitable crop insurance scheme?  Can it be that these policies only benefit the elite?  Those declaring a “class war” focus their demands on a dissolution of parliament and returning power to the people, with seemingly little concern about what kinds of policies will follow. More likely, this discourse of class struggle is a clever, but rather abstract message to propel the real strategy, which is the struggle for Thaksin’s return to power.